Bangladesh, with almost 120 million registered voters, has experienced a steady decline in civil liberties and democratic accountability mechanisms, as per democracy tracking reports. It has been categorised as an ‘Electoral Autocracy’ by V-Dem since 2018 and as ‘Partly Free’ by Freedom House in its reports since start. This decline is especially so in freedom of speech and expression, internet freedom, and press freedom. It is largely attributed to consolidation of executive power, sustained harassment of the opposition, targeting and persecution of critical civil society actors, and discrimination against religious minorities, and refugees. It scored 165/180 countries in Reporter without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index and 41/100 in Freedom of the Net 2023 report. The major reason for declining speech rights and press freedom has been the Digital Security Act/DSA 2018 (specifically sections 25, 29, 31, and 35) that has been used till its replaced by the Cyber Security Act/CSA in 2023 to criminalise online content by critics and opponents of the government and ruling party. In June 2024, student demonstrations against a discriminatory reservation scheme, snowballed into a movement for democratic reform and removal of the autocratic regime of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The regime tried to brutally repress the protesters by unleashing their lethal forces including the police, the Border Guard, the Rapid Action Battalion, and Awami League Party activists. The protests continued unabated. The army chief and his generals soon refused to open fire on protesters to enforce curfew. On 05 August, the Prime Minister stepped down and fled the country. A new interim government led by Novel Laureate Muhammad Yunus faces daunting challenges of dealing with deep-rooted corruption, attacks on minorities, and reforming a government system accused of gross human rights violations. Fake news has surged during this period aggravating socio-political tensions. The new government would need to balance stringent counter-dis/misinformation measures while improving the country's human rights and press freedom record. The role of civic actors becomes more crucial as accountabilty holders and facilitators of democratization in this transitional period.

India, with more than 960 million registered voters, is often described as the world’s largest democracy. However, it has experienced a marked decline in civil liberties in the past decade. In 2021, the V-Dem Institute, which tracks democratic freedoms worldwide, downgraded India to an ‘electoral autocracy’ with its 2024 report describing the country as ‘one of the worst autocratizers’. The Democracy Index published by the Economic Intelligence Unit has categorised India as a 'flawed democracy' while the Freedom House’s annual report on political rights and civil liberties since 2021 noted this decline in liberties classifying the country as ‘Partly Free’ from 2021. One indicator frequently cited in watchdog organizations’ reports has been the precipitous decline in press freedoms with several Indian mainstream media houses being described as pro-regime and critical media being curbed. India scored 159/180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders. There has been a parallel decline in its online freedoms. India scored 50/100 in Freedom of the Net 2023 report. This is noteworthy as India has one of the largest numbers of news media in the world and is the largest internet market in the world. Its civil society and journalists actively engage in social media for their work and advocacy. Since 2019, the country has witnessed civil society- and farmer-led protests, which have led to frequent use of legal and regulatory measures curtailing and criminalizing online content and offline protests that criticized the government. These include Indian Penal Code 1860 (Sections 153A, 292, 295A, 499, 500, 503, 504, 505) and the Information Technology Act (IT Act) 2000 (Sections 67, 69, 79). During the COVID-19 pandemic, with India being one of the worst affected countries in terms of mortality rates, government control of the mainstream and social media increased, leading to further curbs on right to information and speech rights of civil society actors who were not pro-regime. Government’s power over platforms to takedown any content and block any account increased with the passing of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (amended 2023). This has had a widespread chilling effect. In terms of power distribution, socio-economic and political power in India is largely concentrated amongst the wealthy classes and those from the lower or average income who belong to religious and caste groups in regions where they are numerically or traditionally in an advantageous position. As such, government restrictions on civil liberties and the civil society’s capacity to pushback for a diverse country like India are impacted region-wise political dynamics and socio-structural factors. In 2024 General Elections, the National Democratic Alliance coalition government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power for the third time but with a lesser majority. This has revived hopes of a strong political Opposition in the parliament that would prevent the regime from ramming through legislations related to information, communications, and IT that are repressive in content and implementation. Civic actors have become more active and vociferous against legal measures/policies/bills of the government that violate their civil and political liberties, for example, the government holding back on a contentious broadcasting bill that would have made the government the final arbiter of what content could be published or broadcast.

Indonesia was under strict authoritarian rule by General Suharto within the New Order (1966-1998). Subsequent democratization led to the installment of a presidential system with competitive elections and multi-party coalition governments. The reform process stalled after a few years, and since the 2010s scholars increasingly notice tendencies of democratic backsliding. Today, Indonesia is still an electoral Today, Indonesia is still an electoral democracy (also categorized as a “flawed democray” by the Economist Intelligence Unit). According to Civicus, civic space is “obstructed.” Among 179 countries, the country is at rank 87 in V-Dem’s 2023 Liberal Democray Index. This is also reflected in the country’s rank (111 out of 180) in the Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders in 2024, in the 2023 Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Forum (66 out of 142 countries) and in the Freedom House 2023 Freedom on the Net Index (rank 47, “partly free”). Under President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), elected in 2014 and 2019, investigative journalism or criticism of government officials has increasingly become dangerous because any type of statement in social media can easily be criminalized by the authorities. Prabowo Subianto, who will take over the position as President in October 2024, is believed to continue most of Jokowi’s policies. His past as son-in-law of Suharto and army general who commanded special forces renowned for brutality, his right-wing populist style and some of his controversial statements on democracy and human rights have alarmed civil society activists. Freedom of expression is increasingly restricted with the help of a range of repressive laws such as the 2008 Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE) which is often combined with Articles from the old Criminal Code as well as Articles 14 and 15 of Law no. 1/1946 on Criminal Law Regulation (on false information or “fake news”). Whereas the latter articles have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in March 2024, the new Criminal Code, which will be implemented in early 2026, includes new provisions on the spread of false information. Moreover, the revised ITE Law now includes article 28(3) referring to intentionally disseminating content that a person “knew contained false statements that cause public unrest.”

Since achieving national independence in 1957, Malaysia was ruled by a conservative multi-party coalition based on semi-competitive elections. Since 2018, when the opposition won for the first time in elections against the National Front government, political developments are very fluid with different governments and shifting coalitions under Prime Ministers Najib Razak (until 2018), Mahathir Mohamad (2018-2020), Muhyiddin Yassin (2020-2021), Ismail Sabri (2021-2022) and, after the latest November 2022 elections, Anwar Ibrahim. According to V-Dem, Malaysia was in 2023 an electoral democracy (a "flawed democracy" according to the Economist Intelligence Unit), previously it was classified as electoral authoritarian. Among 179 countries, Malaysia is at rank 90 in the 2023 Liberal Democray Index of V-Dem. This medium level is also reflected in the country’s rank in the 2024 Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders (107 out of 180 countries), in the 2023 Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Forum (55 out of 142 countries) and in the 2023 Freedom on the Net Index of Freedom House (rank 61, “partly free”). According to Civicus, civic space in Malaysia is “obstructed.” In a highly polarized society and party system, governments tend to restrict freedom of expression. Whereas in other countries laws and regulations against the spreading of false information of “fake news” are widely used, this is not the case in Malaysia. Paradoxically, the country was among the pioneers of introducing an Anti-Fake News Act in 2018 as an instrument to crack down on government critics. But the law was only used once and was abolished in late 2019. When the reformist Pakatan Harapan coalition fell and a conservative government again took over, it declared a state of emergency and introduced the Emergency (Essential Powers) (No. 2) Ordinance 2021, thereby banning “fake news” on Covid-19 or on the proclamation of the emergency. The ordinance was repealed later that year. Today, especially Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) 1998 as well as Section 505 of the Penal Code are used against spreaders of “fake news.”

Characterised by a weak state and a strong civil society, the Philippines has experienced democratic decline since the rise of former President Rodrigo Duterte. According to the 2023 reports from Varieties of Democracy and the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Philippines is classified as an "electoral autocracy" and a "flawed democracy," respectively. Civicus identifies its civil society space as repressed, and the 2023 Freedom on the Net report deems the Philippines' internet only partly free. Among the six countries in our study, the Philippines is one of the deadliest for journalists, ranking 134th out of 180 countries in the Press Freedom Index, reflecting this troubling trend. Additionally, the country's rule of law is weak, ranking 100th out of 142 countries in the Rule of Law Index. The Philippines has a long-standing history of authoritarianism, notably under President Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s. However, it transitioned to democracy in 1986 through the People Power Revolution. Since then, the country has faced numerous political crises, including popular protests leading to the removal of an elected president and another president's attempt at a coup. Additionally, the growing income disparity, exacerbated by oligarchic control, remains a significant issue. In 2016, former Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte was elected president. Considered an outsider to the established elite, Duterte was seen as a figure who could restore law and order for ordinary Filipinos. However, his populist approach has had negative repercussions, particularly for civil society and critics of his aggressive war on drugs, which has resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of suspected drug pushers. Journalists have also been at risk, facing threats of extrajudicial killings under the guise of combating drug trafficking or countering leftist insurgency. Although the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 was passed during the administration of President Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016), its Chapter 3, Section 4(c)4 on cyber libel has been predominantly exploited during the Duterte administration, primarily against critical journalists. Additionally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Duterte enacted the Bayanihan to Heal As One Act, with authorities using Section 6(f) of the Act to stifle criticism of the government's public health management policies. Duterte was succeeded by Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr., the son of the former dictator. While Marcos Jr.'s policies are less aggressive than Duterte's and civil liberties have slightly improved since his presidency, the Philippines continues to grapple with Duterte's legacy and the prospect that his daughter, Sara Duterte, might win the next presidential election.

Despite brief moments of democratic opening, authoritarianism in Thailand has largely prevailed due to its susceptibility to coups d'état. According to the 2023 reports from Varieties of Democracy and the Economic Intelligence Unit, Thailand is classified as an "electoral autocracy" and a "flawed democracy," respectively. Civicus identifies its civil society space as repressed, and the 2023 Freedom on the Net report deems Thailand's internet unfree. Among the six countries in our study, Thailand ranks best for press freedom at 87 out of 180 countries in the Freedom of the Press Index. However, its rule of law is weak, ranking 82 out of 142 countries in the Rule of Law Index. The country’s democratisation history has been short-lived, with brief democratic intervals in the early 1970s and the 1990s. Elite networks, comprising the palace, the military, the courts and allied business, have dominated the politico-economic landscape and intervened in electoral politics to preserve their hegemony. The country was embroiled in cycles of political struggle between these traditional elites and the new ones representing emerging political parties supported by popular bases. In 2006-2007 and 2014-2019, the two military coups, followed by subsequent juntas, led to the enforcement of various draconian laws, including the Computer-Related Crime Act (CCA). Despite the 2019 and 2023 elections, Thailand remains in the shadow of autocratic elites. Together with other laws, such as Criminal Code (Sections 326–328 on defamation and Article 112 on royal defamation), the CCA has been instrumental in online censorship. The law focuses on content offences committed on a computer, which are defined as the import into a computer system of forged or false computer data. The latter is identified as the information that “is likely to cause damage to a third party or the public…to damage national security or cause public panic…[and to create] an offence against national security…” This vague definition provides the authorities with a broad scope of interpretation of what constitutes damage, national security and public panic. Accordingly, the CCA has been mostly exploited against online critics of the previous junta. The weaponisation of the CCA reinforces the pattern of 'lawfare' in Thailand. The Constitutional Court has dissolved 34 political parties, including four winning parties, and removed four sitting prime ministers. Police, prosecutors, and some judges have played a crucial role in levying multiple charges against dissidents and opposition politicians.